ESSAYS ABOUT THE SATANIC VERSES
Salman Rushdie: Fiction's Embattled Infidel-Gerald
Marzorati
Telling Truth Through Fantasy: Rushdie's Magic
Realism-Michiko Kakutani
Demonizing Discourse in Salman Rushdie's Satanic
Verses
Other:
What about Rushdie-Paul Thoreaux
Salman
Rushdie: Fiction's Embattled Infidel
By Gerald Marzorati
BRICK
LANE, IN LONDON'S EAST END, IS A neighborhood peopled by those
whom the city never expected to accommodate. It is a neighborhood
of Asians - as they are called by the English, who are comfortable
still with the old colonial term that did not distinguish among
the many peoples east of Europe. There are thought to be 40,000
Asians in Brick Lane, mostly Muslims from Bengal, a region cleaved
in 1947 when India was partitioned and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
created. They have come for many reasons - exiles, refugees, schemers
- and they have not always been welcomed. ''Asian'' suggests not
only the distance the immigrants have traveled but also the distance
at which they remain. And something more troubling, a sense of
unease and estrangement, is suggested by newer, post-colonial
terms: quotas, fourth world, National Front, Paki-bashing.
I
walked in Brick Lane one morning last November with the novelist
Salman Rushdie. Rushdie, who is 41, was born in Bombay; he was
sent to England to be schooled, and later chose to settle in London
because London was where he could write the fiction he wanted
to. In Bombay or in any other city in that part of the world,
there wasn't the climate for the writer he wanted to be, not yet.
''I
wanted to write globe-swallowing, capacious books, ones with that
sense of size, novels that expressed history, the public side
of things as well as the private, the intimate,'' he had told
me when I'd first met him, in New York, early last fall.
And
he did write such books. Two sweeping, stylistically dazzling
novels - ''Midnight's Children'' and ''Shame'' - established his
reputation in the early 1980's as one of the most important writers
of his generation in England. Moreover, he is the only one among
them - I am thinking of such writers as Martin Amis, Julian Barnes,
Ian McEwan - whose books have traveled well. Rushdie, in the United
States especially, is discussed in the company of our world storytellers:
Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Milan Kundera, Gunter Grass.
When
I first met Rushdie, I had just finished reading his extraordinary
new novel, ''The Satanic Verses,'' now making its way into American
bookstores. (A review appears today in The Times Book Review.)
The book may be understood as the third volume of an unintended
trilogy, one in which a novelist named Salman Rushdie moves not
only westward but inward, searching for yet another way to redescribe
a world increasingly connected, but in no way whole.
The
societal fissures that Rushdie examines in ''The Satanic Verses''
have been sharply, if strangely, mirrored in the book's reception.
In England, it has attracted praise, award nominations (it won
Britain's Whitbread prize as best novel), and many, many readers.
In England, it has also been vilified and even burned at rallies
by Islamic fundamentalists. The controversy - and it is not just
England's controversy; the book has been banned in India, Egypt
and Saudi Arabia - is about more than the book, of course. But
like all controversies surrounding novels, it has reopened one
of our great cultural questions: how and why does fiction mean
so much?
The
book's opening pages tell of an astonishing, fantastical immigration:
Two middle-aged Indian actors, Gibreel Farishta and Saladin Chamcha,
hurtle through cold thin air toward the English coast - singing,
razzing each other, and already, like all immigrants, longing
at once to remember and to forget. They have been blown out of
a hijacked airliner, and miraculously, after a 29,000-foot free-fall,
survive and make their ways to London. In episode after episode
of the loose, shifting narrative that moves the novel forward
and frames its many stories, they struggle to get a fix on London,
and on themselves. They learn new ways of construing the world.
They are mugged by ghosts - old lovers, old habits of mind and
feeling. They return to the East, in jumbo jets and dreams, but
never fully, never again. (An excerpt appears on page 48.)
Deep,
at times fathomless questions are plumbed: what is the nature
of Good? Of Evil? Is Farishta an archangel? Chumcha Satan? Was
their fall a contemporary version of The Fall? But the novel never
strays too far or too long from London's streets: Rushdie's prose
- the lustrous, alloyed English he's fused from street slang,
Great Books, rock songs, ad jingles, immigrant patois, everything
- has a way of keeping us in the crowded, gritty here and now,
even in the book's most phantasmagoric pages. Farishta and Chumcha,
and the Dickensian array of characters they encounter (or imagine),
people what is ultimately the first major novel of the new England,
an England with more than two million immigrants, one in which
it is no longer clear, exactly, what ''English life'' comprises,
what ''being English'' means.
A
good deal of the novel unfolds in a neighborhood called Brickhall
- a neighborhood, Rushdie had told me, utilizing one of his favorite
locutions, that ''is and is not'' Brick Lane. I had asked him
when I'd met him in New York if he might show me around - Brick
Lane is not a part of London a Western visitor sees - and he had
agreed. But when I'd arrived in London and phoned him, I'd expected
he would tell me he had changed his mind. In places like Brick
Lane now, there were individuals vowing to kill him.
EARLY
IN OCTOBER, ''THE SATANIC Verses'' had been banned by the Indian
Government under pressure from several Muslim leaders, who insisted
that the novel - two hallucinatory chapters of which involve a
prophet who is and is not Mohammed - was insulting to Islam, blasphemous.
By the end of October, the controversy had surfaced elsewhere,
and angrily - in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, South Africa,
every country or city with a sizable Muslim population, including
London, where the book had been published in late September and
had quickly become a best seller.
Rushdie
and his book were denounced in mosques around the city. Hundreds
of protest letters (most of them form letters, a sign of an organized
campaign) were arriving each day at the London offices of Viking,
the book's publisher. Leaders of Islamic groups attending the
annual Conservative Party convention in Brighton called on the
Thatcher Government to ban the book; and it was reported that
Britain's Attorney General had been asked to begin criminal proceedings
against Rushdie under the archaic blasphemy laws. Rushdie received
several phone threats. When, on the night of Oct. 25, he attended
the awards dinner for Britain's most prestigious literary prize,
the Booker -''The Satanic Verses,'' with its many good reviews,
was among the six novels nominated, but did not win - he was accompanied
by a bodyguard.
In
the months that followed, the controversy would not abate. Two
weeks ago, in the city of Bradford in northern England, 1,500
Muslims held a demonstration at which they burned copies of the
novel. W.H. Smith, Britain's biggest bookseller (it has 430 shops),
withdrew the book from display in its two Bradford outlets - this
at a time when it remained high on the best-seller lists. Officials
at Viking, which is believed to have paid an advance of about
$800,000 for world hardbound and paperback rights to the book
- a huge sum for a literary work - is bracing for similar protests
here next month, when Rushdie arrives in the United States to
give public readings from the book. Already, in New York, Viking
has received protest letters and calls from thousands of American
Muslims, and there have also been a number of bomb scares, which
are being investigated by the F.B.I., at the company's offices.
I
had suggested to Rushdie, when I'd talked with him on the phone,
that it might not be such a safe thing for him to walk around
Brick Lane.
''You
cannot let something like this take over your life, or you have
lost,'' he said. He sounded frustrated, beleaguered.
Was
he sure?
''They're
not going to know my face from the book jacket. They're not allowed
to buy the book.''
I
took a taxi to Rushdie's home in a northern borough of London,
and he greeted me at the door, smiling and shaking his head. ''So
strange, all this, isn't it,'' he said. Rushdie's face was dominated
last fall by a black, gray-flecked and somewhat pointy beard,
which he has since shaved off - and a number of cartoonists in
the English papers had been inspired by it, working him up for
the review columns as Satan. But it didn't convince; his eyes,
heavy-lidded behind thick glasses, are too soft. There is no hardness,
either, to the way he holds himself and speaks. You see in his
small gestures and phrasings a hint of formality once adhered
to, but this has given way to gentlemanly casualness. The tautness,
the sharp edges, are kept within somewhere, to emerge only in
the writing.
We
drove down to Brick Lane in Rushdie's Saab, and parked along a
small, charmless side street of small factories and tenements.
It was a cold, damp morning, the sky the color of fine ash, and
the only ones on the block were three young men unloading heavy
rolls of cloth from the back of a truck. Rushdie explained that
this was still London's garment district. The garment business
had once been owned by English Jews who employed other English
Jews, but now it was dominated by the Bengalis. ''That is the
mosque down on the corner,'' pointing down the block to what looked
to me to be simply a large meeting hall. ''It used to be a synagogue.''
We
walked down the block, and turned onto Brick Lane, the narrow
shopping street from which the neighborhood derives its name.
There was a Muslim butcher shop, and the Aladdin Sweet Center,
and signs in Arabic script above all the storefronts, and in the
air the smell of curry. ''The thing you have to understand about
a neighborhood like this,'' Rushdie said now, ''is that when people
board an Air India jet and come halfway across the planet, they
don't just bring their suitcases. They bring everything. And even
as they reinvent themselves in the new city - which is what they
do - there remain these old selves, old traditions erased in part
but not fully. So what you get are these fragmented, multifaceted,
multicultural selves.
''And
this can lead to such strange things,'' he continued. ''You will
find teen-age girls in this neighborhood who in so many ways are
London kids: Levi 501's, Madonna T-shirts, spiky hair. They never
think at all of going back to India or Pakistan, even for a visit.
They might actually have been born here in London. And yet you
may find among them a willingness, an eagerness in some cases,
to have an arranged marriage. An arranged marriage.
''Or
this story: In this very neighborhood, it was early in the 1980's.
A Pakistani father stabbed and murdered his daughter, his only
child, because he heard she had made love to a white boy. Which
turned out not to be true, but that is not my point: My point
is that he had brought with him this idea of honor and shame.
And when I wrote about this later, I said that although I was
obviously appalled - I mean, what can be more awful than murdering
your own child? - I understood what had motivated him. I am a
first-generation immigrant from that part of the world. I know
how you can be here, and, in a way, still there.''
The
setting for ''Midnight's Children'' is Rushdie's boyhood Bombay,
that for ''Shame'' a country he describes as ''not quite Pakistan''
- he had written here but about there. ''The Satanic Verses''
is his first novel to deal with London, with the city that has
been his home for 20 years. I asked him why it had taken him so
long to write about it.
''I
think I just had to do a lot of things first,'' he said. ''I had
to make my reckonings with those other parts of the world I had
come from. Before I had the platform from which to approach this
country.''
As
we walked down the street, he pointed out a video shop that rents
tapes of Bombay-produced Hindi films, hundreds of different ones.
''Watching
these films is entertainment of course,'' he said, ''but this
also nourishes, yes? And in a way, when I go back - inside me,
when I've written, if you understand -this going back to the East
nourishes me. More than anything else, I would say.''
Later,
as we got back into his car, I asked him if he thought those who
wanted his book banned - if he thought they too were, inside themselves,
''going back,'' seeking some kind of nourishment in their religion,
their orthodoxy.
''If
you are asking me if I understand them, well yes, I understand
them. But in a way they are not 'going back' to something. Their
extremism is actually something fairly new. I have written about
Islamic culture in the novel - Islamic culture set against the
background of the West. Basically, Islamic culture is the one
in which I grew up - I know it well. Its narratives are my narratives.''
''But
their Islamic culture is something new and dangerous. You have
a situation where a handful of extremists are defining Islam.
And what makes it even sadder for me is that they are simply feeding
the Western stereotype: the backward, cruel, rigid Muslim, burning
books and threatening to kill the blasphemer.''
THE
FOLLOWING morning, I walked up to the London Central Mosque in
St. John's Wood -the city's largest mosque and, I was told, the
organizational base for the protest against ''The Satanic Verses.''
The
mosque is huge, with a glittering golden dome I could glimpse,
despite the day's thick fog, as I walked toward it through Regent's
Park. I wanted to see Dr. Ali Mugram al-Ghamdi, director general
of the Islamic Cultural Center, which has its offices at the mosque.
Dr. al-Ghamdi was leading the fight against ''The Satanic Verses''
in London - he had been quoted as calling the novel ''the most
offensive, filthy and abusive book ever written by any hostile
enemy of Islam.'' I had tried to phone him, and could not get
through, and so I'd decided to simply present myself.
It
was a Friday, prayer day, not the best day to talk, his secretary
explained, but yes, Dr. al-Ghamdi would see me. He emerged from
his office minutes later. He was a short and round man, elegantly
dressed in a pin-stripe suit and fine silk tie. He extended his
hand in greeting, invited me in, and pushed closely together two
chairs, where we sat.
I
explained how I had spoken the day before with Rushdie about his
novel, its spiritual themes. After our walk in Brick Lane, we
had gone to a pub, and at one point, as we talked, he had said,
''I obviously did not set out to write a novel about Islam - and
it is not a novel about Islam. The novel does deal with spiritual
life, very much so - that's one aspect of the book. There is a
hole inside me where God used to be - I am no longer an observant
Muslim - and I wanted to explore this hole. And of course that's
what novels do, isn't it? Explore.''
And
now, sitting with Dr. al-Ghamdi, I asked if he could understand
the book in this way - as an inquiry.
''The
book is really very, very offensive,'' he said gently, with no
bitterness. ''I cannot overstate this. And I cannot expect you
- you who are not a Muslim - to feel this.'' Then, addressing
my question more directly: ''This was something that the author
deliberately did. This was not just a slip of the pen.''
We
discussed the parts of ''The Satanic Verses'' that have caused
most offense to fundamentalist Muslims. Gibreel Farishta, who
back in Bombay had starred in popular religious films, suffers
a breakdown, and we are made privy to his mad dreams, dreams in
which he supposes himself to be the Archangel Gabriel. For many
Muslims, the Koran is held to be the ''uncreated'' Word of God,
dictated by the Archangel Gabriel through the Prophet Mohammed,
and written down, perfect and unaltered, by the Prophet's scribes.
In
the dreams of Rushdie's Gibreel, a certain Salman the Persian,
in the employ of the Prophet Mahound, makes a deliberate mistake
in his transcription - he wants to see just how divine the Prophet
is - and when the Prophet reads over the text, the mistake goes
unnoticed.
Rushdie
also ''redreams'' (his word) the famous episode in Islam of the
''Satanic verses,'' from which the novel takes its title. Historians
of Islam explain it this way: Mohammed was under pressure from
the citizens of Mecca to moderate his staunch monotheism, to accommodate
his new faith to the city's traditional polytheism, to make room
in Islam for three local goddesses. He did; he had his scribes
write down verses praising al-Lat, al-Uzza and Manat as the ''swans
exalted, whose intercession is hoped for.'' But he soon revoked
these verses. He'd had a true revelation from the Archangel Gabriel,
who told him they had been dictated by Satan.
Mahound,
too, is visited by Satan and tempted to do more than utter compromised
verse to scribes. Mahound likes to eat what he forbids others
to - ''those fabled and legendary unclean creatures, what's their
name, prawns.'' He also likes the whores. Where, in the Koran,
Mohammed has many wives, revered as the Mothers of the Believers,
the fictional Mahound has a brothel.
I
said to Dr. al-Ghamdi that even though Christian fundamentalists
might object to the use of Christian allegory and symbol in a
novel like ''The Scarlet Letter,'' or to historical depictions
of Christ in movies like ''The Last Temptation of Christ,'' they
have come to see that in Western society, there is no way to enforce
religious orthodoxy. Anyway, I said, most Western readers would
understand Mahound as a religious hypocrite, a satiric creation,
nothing more, nothing historical.
Dr.
al-Ghamdi looked now to be practicing patience. ''For us,'' he
said, ''this is not a matter of long ago. The Prophet Mohammed
and his family are alive for us. They are here, with us, and we
love them so much. I am prepared - and not only me - I am prepared
to die one thousand deaths to assure that Mohammed and his family
are not hurt. Such anguish this book has caused.''
I
asked him what the solution was.
He
wanted the book banned, he said. He would like Viking to act on
its own, to withdraw the book from the stores.
I
told him that Viking had issued statements saying it had not meant
to offend anyone, that it regretted any distress the book may
cause, but that it believed in Rushdie, his novel - and especially
in freedom of expression. I said that freedom of expression was
a very important Western concept.
''Islam
has never been accepted here all through history,'' Dr. al-Ghamdi
said. ''Here, you can just trample on people's feelings. You call
that freedom of expression? And then you are shocked when emotions
run high.''
I
asked him about the threats made on Rushdie's life. What did he
feel about these threats? Wasn't he, whether he realized it or
not, inciting people with his talk?
His
face tensed. ''We are trying to project a mature community here,''
he said. ''I am doing my best to keep the community in check.''
He
got up from his chair, walked over to his desk, and lifted from
it a manila folder thick with papers. ''These letters,'' he said,
''you should see what people say.'' I asked if I could read them.
''They are in Arabic,'' he said. ''You do not read Arabic.'' He
picked one up himself, then another, then another. And now he
giggled a little. What did it say? ''This is not for you,'' he
said. Our meeting was over.
THAT
EVENING, I was invited to a dinner party at Rushdie's home. It
was to be a New England-style Thanksgiving feast, planned and
cooked by Rushdie's wife, the American writer Marianne Wiggins.
(Rushdie's first marriage ended in divorce several years ago.
He has a 9-year-old son by the marriage, Zafar.) Their house is
a four-story row house on what had not long ago been a working-class
block, and Rushdie's studio is on the top floor; there, each morning
at an electric typewriter, he tries to write 700 good words. He
had yet to begin a new novel, that would take time, much thinking.
He would travel first, write essays. Rushdie is a writer in the
very English way of Orwell - he takes stands. He has written a
slim, sympathetic book about Sandinista Nicaragua, and he has
frequently spoken out - in the British papers, on television -on
what he sees as Britain's two great problems: ''institutionalized''
racism (in employment practices and housing), and the domestic
policies of the Thatcher Government.
Rushdie's
politics do not sit well with many in English literary circles,
and especially, it would seem, with the press. He is described
as arrogant, self-righteous. Challenging Rushdie's thinking about
racism in England, and his sincerity as well - and perhaps revealing
the very tension he is seeking to deny - a reporter in The Sunday
Times of London Magazine recently wrote: ''Certainly he is assimilated
to the extent of being one of the 20 just persons summoned to
the [ Harold ] Pinter dinner table in Campden Hill Square to discuss
opposition to Thatcherism.''
In
the front room on the parlor floor as I entered Rushdie's house
that night, I saw two large tables: There were to be many guests.
A number of them were already downstairs, clustered in the kitchen
and in Wiggins's study: the critic Michael Ignatieff; the American
writer Michael Herr, author of the Vietnam book ''Dispatches'';
the poet Tess Gallagher, in town for a memorial held in honor
of her husband, Raymond Carver. A literary crowd; Rushdie has
many friends in literary circles, too. And Rushdie was in good
spirits, truly at home (as most writers are) among writers he
likes.
Upstairs
later, watching Rushdie propose a toast above the all-American
turkey and stuffing and sweet potatoes, I recalled a passage from
''The Satanic Verses'': An Indian boy, at boarding school in England
only a few days, comes down to breakfast to find a kipper on his
plate. He has no idea how to eat it, and his fellow students have
no intention of telling him.
''
[ H ] e cut into it, and got a mouthful of tiny bones. And after
extracting them all, another mouthful, more bones. It took him
ninety minutes to eat the fish.'' Chewing, he has this revelation:
''England was a peculiar tasting smoked fish full of spikes and
bones, and nobody would ever tell him how to eat it.'' He discovers
he is tough and vengeful. ''I'll show them all,'' he swears. ''See
if I don't.''
After
dinner, I asked Rushdie about the kipper: It seemed too painful,
too sadly funny, to be anything but autobiographical. ''Yes, I'm
afraid it's only slightly embellished,'' he said. ''And I've never
eaten another one.''
He'd
been sent from India to Rugby at age 13. His family was Bombay
upper-middle-class; his grandfather had made the family money
and his father, who died two years ago, had, in Rushdie's words,
''spent the rest of his life losing it.'' Salman, the only son
(he has three sisters), had attended the British-style Cathedral
School in Bombay before being sent abroad.
''I
was miserable at Rugby,'' he told me a couple of days later when
we sat and talked again at his home. ''I think I had actually
wanted to go - I was groomed for it. Very conventional. Bookish
- I was the kind of boy who got books for presents. No good at
games.
''But
at Rugby I was suddenly an Indian. There are no Indians in India.
There are classes, of course, and regional identifications. Here
in England, however, it is largely understood as a race - and
at the school-boy level, back then, that was no fun.'' The boys
at Rugby not only watched Rushdie struggle with his kipper, but
scrawled racist graffiti. He has told friends of his that he never
really made a friend there.
His
father had attended King's College, Cambridge, and he expected
his son to follow when he was graduated from Rugby. Rushdie refused,
then pleaded, then enrolled for classes in the fall of 1964. He
knew he wanted to be a writer, he told me - his hero, he said,
was the acclaimed Urdu poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz. However, he chose
to study not literature but history. (Most of the references to
Islamic history in ''The Satanic Verses'' are drawn from one of
his college papers.) Rushdie liked Cambridge. It was the 1960's:
''Everyone was rethinking things,'' he said. ''I was too.'' He
became interested in the theater, got parts and worked backstage
as well in a number of college productions.
In
the spring of 1968, he graduated from Cambridge, and returned
home - not to Bombay, but to Karachi. His parents had moved there
several years before. ''I was so angry they had moved to Pakistan,''
he said. ''But in truth when I'd left England, I'd only purchased
a one-way ticket.''
His
stay in Pakistan turned out to be short, sour. Not long after
arriving, he began putting together a production of Edward Albee's
''Zoo Story'' for the country's new government-operated television
station.
''Well,''
he said. ''it turned out one of the lines in the play includes
the word 'pork.' A character is regularly attacked by his landlady's
dog, and to keep the dog away he goes and buys these hamburgers,
which he tosses to it. It doesn't work: The dog doesn't go for
the hamburgers. And the character has to say something to the
effect that he can't understand why the dog doesn't like the hamburgers.
After all, there isn't enough pork in them to make them disgusting.
''O.K.
The play is censored. One can't say the word 'pork' on TV in Pakistan.
So I appeal. I say, What more could you ask for? Here is a play
in which an actor points up how disgusting pork is. I mean, this
is very sophisticated antipork propaganda if you consider it.
But no one saw it that way. Pork was simply a four-letter word.''
An
article he wrote for a small magazine on his first impressions
of Pakistan was also censored. Before the end of the year, he
was back in England. He would return East in the future only to
visit.
It
was in 1970, after having worked for a time in experimental theater,
when Rushdie turned his energies to writing fiction. ''I'd always
imagined myself telling stories, and now I imagined I had stories
to tell,'' he said.
Beginning
at that time as well, and then for 10 years, he worked to support
himself as an advertising copywriter, first at Ogilvy and Mather,
then at Charles Barker. Nights, weekends he devoted to his novels.
Drafts came slowly (and still do; it took Rushdie five years to
complete ''The Satanic Verses''). He abandoned one novel, about
a Muslim holy man. Late in 1973, having taken time off from his
advertising job, he completed what would be his first published
novel, ''Grimus'' - a dystopian allegory set on an imaginary island,
a novel quite remote from the kind of writing he would do later.
(The book was poorly received.) However, the language, aural and
eclectic, hints at things to come, as does this line from the
book: ''It is the natural condition of the exile, putting down
roots in memory.''
This
process of using one's own stories and experiences began for Rushdie
with ''Midnight's Children,'' which he completed in 1979. He had
traveled to Bombay shortly after finishing ''Grimus,'' and the
trip had been important to him. He decided at that time not only
to write an autobiographical novel, but to write one that would
encompass the biggest of India's cities, its people and history.
''I
think I saw the Bombay I had grown up in slipping away,'' he told
me, ''and that made me get on with the writing. I felt I had to
reclaim the city - and also my own memories of it. I wanted to
tell India's story, or stories, as well as my own.'' ''Floating
in the amniotic fluid of the past,'' as he writes in ''Midnight's
Children,'' Rushdie not only found his own story, and that of
the nation of India; he found a way of telling. He mixed the fabulous
and the historic, he made room for anecdotes, tales, essayistic
asides, political commentary, digressions, retracings, sidetracks
- the draft of the novel ran to 900 pages.
''Midnight's
Children'' was a huge critical success. It won the 1981 Booker
Prize, and along with the prestige came a check for $10,000. Rushdie
was 34, but in a photo I have seen of him holding up the check,
he could be a struggling graduate student, save for the grin that
conveys: I guess I showed you.
ON
MY LAST DAY IN London, I visited Rushdie again, and we talked
more about his novel. But talk kept spilling beyond strictly literary
matters. The Islamic fundamentalists came up again. ''I am most
afraid that they will succeed in reducing the novel in people's
minds to a pamphlet,'' he said.
Two
weeks ago, after the Bradford book burning, I spoke with Rushdie
on the phone, and he said: ''When they burned my book, in a way
as if it were a pamphlet, I think they went too far. It is such
a charged image. It got people concerned about me, sympathetic
toward me, who had been content to sit on the sidelines. There
were Labor Party M.P.'s - Asians representing Bradford - who attended
that book burning; that's a horrible thought for many people.
They get to thinking, 'If it's him today, it's me tomorrow.' ''
It
struck me, his use of ''him,'' ''me,'' ''they.'' I remembered
what he had told me just before I left his house that day in London:
''In
writing 'The Satanic Verses,' I think I was writing for the first
time from the whole of myself. The English part, the Indian part.
The part of me that loves London, and the part that longs for
Bombay. And at my typewriter, alone, I could indulge this.
''But
most of the time, people will ask me - will ask anyone like me
- are you Indian? Pakistani? English?
''What
is being expresssed is a discomfort with a plural identity. And
what I am saying to you - and saying in the novel - is that we
have got to come to terms with this. We are increasingly becoming
a world of migrants, made up of bits and fragments from here,
there. We are here. And we have never really left anywhere we
have been.''
[Credit:
Gerald Marzorati, a senior editor of Harper's, writes regularly
for The New York Times Magazine on literary subjects. January
29,1989 New York Times.] TOP
Critic's
Notebook; Telling Truth Through Fantasy: Rushdie's Magic Realism
By Michiko Kakutani
A yatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's death sentence against the author
Salman Rushdie, a half-dozen deaths and hundreds of injuries in
Pakistan during riots over his novel, the subsequent disappearance
of ''The Satanic Verses'' from bookstores around the world and
a continuing international furor - had such events occurred in
a novel (even one of Mr. Rushdie's own fantastical productions),
they would have been dismissed by critics as the improbable inventions
of a writer bent on satire or absurdist mischief.
That
these events have actually come to pass only serves to underscore
the ability of reality to continually overtake our imaginations
- a predicament, oddly enough, that has long troubled writers
like Mr. Rushdie and that has indelibly shaped the character of
their work.
Writers
throughout this century, in fact, have struggled to render a reality
that has seemed increasingly unreal. World War I fostered the
fragmentations of modernism; World War II raised new questions
about the limits of language and perception. And in the wake of
the 1960's - which witnessed the assassinations of the Kennedy
brothers and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the divisive
war in Vietnam and growing unrest in the third world - novelists,
both here and abroad began to experiment more freely with alternatives
to naturalism.
In
this country, Donald Barthelme created surreal fictional collages
that used Brechtian devices to force the reader to re-examine
his relationship with the printed word. Norman Mailer temporarily
turned to journalism as a substitute for fiction. And Philip Roth,
who noted writers' ''inability or unwillingness to deal'' imaginatively
with ''our cultural predicament,'' experimented with such comic
fantasies as ''Our Gang'' and ''The Breast.'' In other countries,
writers embraced a kind of phantasmagorial writing known as magic
realism - a narrative technique used by Mr. Rushdie, himself,
in his earlier novels, ''Midnight's Children'' (1981) and ''Shame''
(1983), as well as ''The Satanic Verses.''
It
is no coincidence that magic realism - which combines heightened
language with elements of the surreal - has tended to flourish
in troubled areas of the world, or that many of its practitioners
have sought to describe calamitous events that exceed the grasp
of normal description. The transactions between the extraordinary
and the mundane that occur in so much Latin American fiction are
not merely a literary technique, but also a mirror of a reality
in which the fantastic is frequently part of everyday life - a
reality in which military death squads have effectively turned
the word ''disappear'' into a transitive verb. Similarly, the
grotesque inventions of Gunter Grass's ''Tin Drum'' serve as a
perfect mirror of the novel's subject - German history before,
during and after World War II.
In
the case of Mr. Rushdie, he has used the hallucinatory devices
of magic realism to try to capture, metaphorically, the sweep
and chaos of contemporary reality, its resemblance to a dream
or nightmare. For instance, in ''The Satanic Verses,'' strange
and impossible events occur: an orphan girl subsists on a diet
of butterflies; two men fall from an airplane and miraculously
survive; one sprouts an angelic halo, and the other, a tail and
horns. The characters' bizarre adventures, the novel's numerous
dream sequences, the convolutions of its plot, the melodramatic
effusions of Mr. Rushdie's prose - all are meant, in some heightened
way, to give the reader a sense of just how fantastic recent history
has become.
Many
American and British writers have reacted to the growing confusion
of the public world by focusing on the more accessible world of
the self. Earlier Indian writers like R. K. Narayan and Anita
Desai have withdrawn from the turmoil of their times to create
charming miniaturist portraits. Mr. Rushdie, however, has always
maintained that the writer has a responsibility to tackle the
larger issues of the day. ''It seems to me imperative that literature
enter such arguments,'' he wrote in an essay, ''because what is
being disputed is nothing less than what is the case, what is
truth and what untruth, and the battleground is our imagination.
If writers leave the business of making pictures of the world
to politicians, it will be one of history's great and most abject
abdications.''
''There
is a genuine need for political fiction,'' he continued, ''for
books that draw new and better maps of reality, and make new languages
with which we can understand the world.'' It is necessary, even
exhilarating, he wrote, ''to grapple with the special problems
created by the incorporation of political material, because politics
is by turns farce and tragedy, and sometimes (for example, Zia's
Pakistan) both at once.''
In
''Midnight's Children,'' Mr. Rushdie used a hyperbolic narrative
- by turns lyric and vulgar, street smart and allusive - and a
cast of improbable characters (a telepathic narrator, a child
who can travel through time, another who can change sex at will)
to create a parable of modern Indian history. His next novel,
''Shame,'' turned from India to a country that was ''not quite
Pakistan,'' using a character named Raza Hyder as a kind of fictional
surrogate for Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, the former President of
Pakistan. As Mr. Rushdie saw it, the story he wanted to tell was
''a tragedy on a very large scale,'' but its ''protagonists are
not tragic actors.''
''It's
as if you had 'Macbeth,' '' he said, ''and you cast a group of
second-rate vaudeville clowns in it, and you have clowns trying
to speak those great lines.''
When
''Shame'' was published in 1983, many critics, here and in Great
Britain, remarked upon the author's gift for comic invention.
''Mr. Rushdie particularly delights in palpable absurdities such
as those resulting from Raza Hyder's attempt to impose Islamic
fundamentalism upon his country after seizing power,'' wrote the
critic Robert Towers in The New York Times Book Review.
In
one episode cited by Mr. Towers, a simpering foreign journalist
asks Hyder if he has a ''point of view about the allegation that
your institution of such Islamic punishments as flogging and cutting-off
of hands might be seen in certain quarters as being, arguably,
according to certain definitions, so to speak, barbaric?'' Hyder
replies: ''We will not simply order people to stick out their
hands, like this, and go fataakh! with a butcher's knife. No,
sir. All will be done under the most hygienic conditions, with
proper medical supervision, use of anaesthetic etcetera.''
In
light of recent developments, many aspects of ''Shame'' now seem
less satirical than oddly prescient. In one passage, the narrator
expresses little surprise that a Pakistani man, living in London,
has killed his daughter for sleeping with an English boy: ''We
who have grown up on a diet of honour and shame can still grasp
what must seem unthinkable to peoples living in the aftermath
of the death of God and of tragedy: that men will sacrifice their
dearest love on the implacable altars of their pride.''
In
another aside, the narrator muses upon the fate of Islamic fundamentalism.
''Autocratic regimes find it useful to espouse the rhetoric of
faith,'' he says, ''because people respect that language, are
reluctant to oppose it. This is how religions shore up dictators;
by encircling them with words of power, words which the people
are reluctant to see discredited, disenfranchised, mocked.''
In
''The Satanic Verses,'' a character named Gibreel similarly observes
that ''something was badly amiss with the spiritual life of the
planet.'' ''Too many demons,'' he thinks, ''inside people claiming
to believe in God.''
One
of the multiple ironies of Mr. Rushdie's situation, of course,
is that his own words in ''The Satanic Verses''- the words of
a novelist, not a religious zealot - are now being taken so solemnly
by his Muslim opponents, who literally want to make them a matter
of life and death. It's a situation not unrelated to the one that
obtains in countries in other regions - from Latin America to
Eastern Europe - that have responded to writers' work with jail
sentences, torture and exile. Just this week, the playwright Vaclav
Havel was sentenced to jail by a Prague court for inciting illegal
protests and obstructing the police; Mr. Havel maintained his
innocence. His plays have not been produced in Czechoslovakia
in 20 years.
To
writers in America, the stakes are considerably different. At
worst, a writer risks bad reviews, embarrassment, a loss of self-esteem;
at best, a writer garners fame, money, fancy invitations. Given
this situation in which freedom is taken for granted but writers
are often looked upon as glorified entertainers, it's not surprising
that booksellers were so quick to remove ''The Satanic Verses''
from their shelves. Nor is it surprising that many authors, who
were initially silent, are now condemning one another for not
doing enough in defense of Mr. Rushdie's book.
As
for Mr. Rushdie, he remains in hiding in Great Britain, where
he doubtless has time to begin work on a new novel. Although he
once observed that his fictions often contain characters close
to himself - but exaggerated ''to make things easier to discuss''
- he will have difficulty, this time, embellishing the ''farce
and tragedy'' of what has happened in real life.
[Credit:
New York Times, February 24, 1989.]
Demonizing Discourse in Salman Rushdie's Satanic
Verses
Brian
Finney
Salman
Rushdie's The Satanic Verses (1988) is one of the relatively few
works of fiction to have made a significant and permanent impact
outside the enclosed world of literature. Despite W. H. Auden's
assertion that "poetry [by which he meant imaginative literature
in general] makes nothing happen," this novel has clearly
made a number of things happen. It has led to the loss of over
twenty lives. It made its author go into hiding from the Ayatollah
Khomeini's fatwa of 1989 where he has remained under government
protection ever since. Above all, coinciding with the ending of
the Cold War, it has played a significant role in redefining the
West's image of itself. The Other is no longer the threat of Communism,
but that of Islamic fundamentalism - far more of a paper tiger
than the very real nuclear menace offered by the USSR and its
allies. The book was similarly used by Islamic clerics to reinforce
their image of the United States (and its Western allies) as the
Great Satan - doubly ironical seeing what a fierce critic of American
policy abroad Rushdie had shown himself to be in The Jaguar Smile:
A Nicaraguan Journey (1987) . The Iranian President Khamene'i
told his followers, "The Satanic Verses...is no doubt one
of the verses of the Great Satan" (Appignanesi 87). In giving
Rushdie's ironic title a literal reading (although itself figurative
in another way) Khamene'i politicized the novel irrevocably. The
Ayatollah Khomeini justified his fatwa against Rushdie by similarly
accusing him and "the world devourers" (the West) of
publishing The Satanic Verses as "a calculated move aimed
at rooting out religion and religiousness, and above all, Islam
and its clergy" (Appignanesi 90). Considering that the clergy
in Iran occupied the highest positions of political power, it
can be seen how threatening Rushdie's novel must have appeared
to the leaders of an Islamic theocratic state.
Whereas
Western politicians have chosen to represent this conflict as
a battle between democratic freedom of speech and autocratic censorship
or even terrorism (the fatwa), Rushdie's ideological stance, both
within the the novel and in his numerous comments on its reception,
is a great deal more complex and problematical. In an article
written about responses to the book, "In Good Faith"
(1990), Rushdie insists that he has "never seen this controversy
as a struggle between Western freedoms and Eastern unfreedom."
Instead, he asserts, his novel champions "doubts, uncertainties."
"It dissents from the end of debate, of dispute, of dissent"
(Imaginary Homelands 396). In defending his right to defend all
issues endlessly, to postpone closure indefinitely, to oppose
certainties of all kinds whether they originate in the East or
the West, Rushdie is clearly positioning himself as a writer in
a postmodern world where nothing can be asserted with assurance.
"I am a modern, and modernist, urban man," he insists
in the same essay, "accepting uncertainty as the only constant,
change as the only sure thing" (404-5). This refusal to countenance
any of the grand narratives that have governed Eastern or Western
civilization is precisely the stance that Jean-François
Lyotard identifies as central to the postmodern condition. Rushdie
has been simultaneously hailed by many critics as the preeminent
practitioner of post-colonial writing which is normally characterized
by its opposition to the values and ideology of the metropolitan
center. While postmodernism itself is said to embrace cultural
relativity, it tends to prioritize relativity per se, whereas
post-colonialism normally prioritizes non-Western culural diversity.
In other words there is an implicit conflict in the two positions:
post-colonialism adopts specific political positions which postmodernism
goes out of its way to relativize.
Rushdie's own life history further complicates this dichotomy.
Brought up a Muslim in a Hindu country, he was sent to an English
public school at the age of fourteen, and chose to stay on in
England after obtaining a degree in history at King's College,
London. Self-exiled from his native country, he was repeatedly
rebuffed by the inherent racism he met with in his adopted country.
Prior to the proclamation of the fatwa Rushdie was one of the
acutest critics of the Thatcher regime's brand of racist politics.
After he was placed in the care of the British security services
he found himself in the ambivalent position of an adopted citizen
owing his life to a government that was simultaneously passing
anti-immigrant legislation motivated by the fear of being swamped
by alien races. Marginalized racially, Rushdie nevertheless belongs
more to the center of the dominant culture when considered in
terms of class and wealth. He has turned the hybridity of his
migrant (as opposed to immigrant) status into a desirable if uncomfortable
mode of existence. It offers him freedom from "the shackles
of nationalism," but it is "a burdensome freedom"
(Imaginary Homelands 124). It means that writers in his position
"are capable of writing from a kind of double perspective,
because they, we, are at one and the same time insiders and outsiders
in this society" (19). As an insider, Rushdie is postmodern
in his validation of the uncertainty principle, including the
area of religious belief. As an outsider, he is post-colonialist
in his satirical subversion of the certainties of metropolitan
(Thatcherite) politics and the center's exercise of power.
Rushdie
attempts to reconcile these internal stresses by resorting to
a trope - that of oxymoron - by means of which he seeks to celebrate
the certainty of uncertainty, the singular affirmation of plurality.
Inevitably he has been taken to task by each camp for supposedly
embracing the opposing one. In particular, he has come under sustained
attack for his quintessentially postmodern attitude by Marxists,
especially by Aijaz Ahmad. Ahmad attacks Rushdie on the grounds
that his fictional space is "occupied so entirely by Power
that there is no space left for either resistance or its representation"
(127). In Ahmad's eyes Rushdie lacks proper anti-imperialist political
conviction. However, critics such as Ahmad embody a specific post-colonial
interpretation of the political that is far too crude when applied
to Rushdie's writings. Rushdie refuses to adopt any easy position
in the post-colonial debate, because he stands on both sides of
its divide. This enables him to discern in both dominant and emergent
cultures the same desire to appropriate the truth for themselves
and to use this truth to valorize their imposition of it on believers
and dissenters alike.
Despite
Rushdie's later protestations, there is no doubt that he set out
in this novel to confront what he disparagingly calls "Actually
Existing Islam" (by which he means "the political and
priestly power structure that presently dominates and stifles
Muslim societies") with the uncertainties governing the circumstances
under which the Qu'ran came into existence (Imaginary Homelands
436). The original verbal battle between Muhammad and the poets
who defended the polytheism he set out to replace, which is reenacted
in Rushdie's fictional reconstruction of it, has since been replayed
- verbally - between its author and the mullahs. Islamic fundamentalism
squares off against Islamic secularism (Rushdie was brought up
in a Muslim family where, however, "there was an absolute
willingness to discuss anything." Appignanesi 30). As Aamir
Mufti has put it, "in secularizing (and hence profaning)
the sacred 'tropology' of Islam by insisting upon its appropriation
for the purposes of fiction, the novel throws into doubt the discursive
edifice within which Islam has been produced in recent years"
(107). In effect Rushdie chooses to oppose the anti-imperialist
discursive formation of Islam by pitting against it the alternative
discursive formation of imaginative fiction. Rushdie seems to
see in fictional discourse a neutral discursive space in which
he can give free play to competing discourses that oppose both
the discourse of Islam and that of Thatcherite nationalism. The
Satanic Verses, then, can be seen as a bricolage of conflicting
discourses framed by the controlling discourse of fiction. But
just how neutral is a discourse that controls? In its postmodern
form is not fictional discourse itself competing for dominance
with the other discursive formations it seeks to incorporate within
its all-embracing grasp?
The
use of discursive formations, according to Michel Foucault, represents
an attempt to control and contain the "barely imaginable
powers and dangers," the "ponderous, awesome materiality"
of language (Archaeology/Discourse 216). Within The Satanic Verses
Rushdie pits secular against sacred, nationalist or racist against
transnationalist or migrant, historical against ahistorical, and
above all, authoritative against fictional forms of discourse.
I want to concentrate on Rushdie's attempt to use fictional discourse
to undermine the totalizing discourses of religion and nationalism.
To undermine is not necessarily to destroy. Rushdie has said that
the novel is an exploration of the "God-shaped hole"
left in him after he had abandoned the "unarguable absolutes
of religion" (Appignanesi 75). Apart from a brief moment
of reverse apostasy during the period of the fatwa, he has remained
a secular Muslim who has always aspired to achieve within an aesthetic
context that transcendence experienced by the religious mystic.
He maintains that art, like religion, can produce a "flight
of the human spirit outside the confines of its material, physical
existence" (Imaginary Homelands 421). Clearly the danger
for someone holding this belief is that he will treat art or fiction
as a transcendental signifier. Like many writers of the twentieth
century, he is looking for an alternative religious experience
outside the restrictive confines of an organized religion such
as that of Islam (which literally means "Submission").
He would claim that, unlike Islamic fundamentalists, he does not
seek to compel anyone to accept his aesthetic ideology. Nevertheless
he clearly believes that this ideology is superior to that of
either the fundamentalists
or the imperialists. He has no wish to compel, but a strong wish
to persuade.
This
still leaves open to question why Rushdie should think that the
discourse of art or fiction should have a truth-value unavailable
to revealed religion. Can there be a hierarchy of discourses?
According to Foucault all discourses are equally subject to their
own particular confining sets of rules. If this is the case, why
should the discourses of fundamentalist religion and nationalism
find Rushdie's use of fictional discourse in The Satanic Verses
so threatening? Is it because fiction claims to incorporate those
other discursive formations within its own discourse and in doing
so to reveal the will to power underlying their will to truth?
(But doesn't the Qu'ran do the same thing in its treatment of
contemporary poets?) Foucault identifies the will to truth as
the most important of the three systems of exclusion that govern
discourse. He claims that it has tended to assimilate the other
two systems - prohibited words, and the division between reason
and folly. Each discursive formation claims for itself the status
of "true" discourse, concealing behind its will to constitute
the truth of things its desire for power. This is obviously the
case in the instance of a theocratic state such as Iran where
Islamic faith (of the Shi'ite variety) is invoked to justify a
war against even fellow (Sunni) Muslims of a neighboring state
such as Iraq. By calling it a jihad or holy war, by definition
a war waged against infidels, such a state draws on the discourse
of "true" religion to sanction its naked nationalist
and political ambitions. In a similar fashion Mrs. Thatcher appealed
to the "truth" of the rights to self-determination by
the Falkland Islanders to sanction her desire to retain political
power back in the metropolitan center.
But
Foucault insists that the same great systems of exclusion govern
the discourse of literature. Literature too feels that it has
to extend its power over its readers by claiming truth for itself.
According to Foucault, "Western literature has, for centuries,
sought to base itself in nature, in the plausible, upon sincerity
and science-in short, upon true discourse" (Archaeology/Discourse
219). One might argue that what is loosely referred to as postmodern
literature does anything but base itself on nature. As Mimi insists
in the novel: "I ...am conversant with postmodernist critiques
of the West, e.g. that we have here a society capable only of
pastiche: a 'flattened' world" (261). Rushdie has obviously
read his Jameson. Yet when Rushdie comes to defend fiction in
his own person he claims that postmodern writing offers the truest
reflection of contemporary human experience: a "rejection
of totalized explanations is the modern condition. And this is
where the novel, the form created to discuss the fragmentation
of truth, comes in...The elevation of the quest for the Grail
over the Grail itself, the acceptance that all that is solid has
melted into air, that reality and morality are not givens but
imperfect human constructs, is the point from which fiction begins"
(Imaginary Homelands 422). This comes close to basing fiction
in nature by redefining the natural. Rushdie is unashamedly pitting
his naturalized fictional discourse against what he terms (with
an acknowledgment to Lyotard) the unnatural, totalizing discourses
of religion and national politics. As Foucault suggests, the will
to truth "tends to exercise a sort of pressure, a power of
constraint upon other forms of discourse" (Archaeology/Discourse
219).
In
effect Rushdie claims for fictional discourse an imaginative form
of truth where freedom reigns in place of institutional control.
Fiction, he maintains, can flout the mundane facts and still appeal
to the world of the imagination to claim that it represents the
"true" or authentic transcription of human experience.
In "Imaginary Homelands" he argues that "[w]riters
and politicians are natural rivals. Both groups try to make the
world in their own images; they fight for the same territory.
And the novel is one way of denying the official, politicians'
version of the truth" (14). Rushdie's figurative allusions
here are revealing. While he is ostensibly arguing about claims
to truthfulness, his vocabulary ("rivals," "fight,"
"territory") belongs to the the world for power.
In
the opening chapter of the novel Rushdie forces his readers to
become conscious of the paradoxical nature of fiction's notion
of "true" discourse: "Once upon a time - it was
and it was not so, as the old stories used to say, it happened
and it never did - maybe, then, or maybe not..." (35). All
fictional discourse is predicated by that "maybe." It
is for the reader to decide on the probability of the imaginative
construct. The book begins by flouting any sense of factual reality
with an impossible rebirth - two actors (as the two main protagonists
are tellingly characterized) falling to earth without parachutes
or wings from a height of twenty nine thousand feet. Other improbabilities
follow. Gibreel acquires a halo and Chamcha goat hooves and horns.
A dead lover visits Gibreel on a magic carpet. Gibreel tropicalizes
London's climate. The British authorities turn immigrants into
a water-buffalo, slippery snakes and a manticore, itself a beast
of fictional invention. In effect Rushdie is exploiting the extended
boundaries of fictional discourse to demonstrate that what is
invented is not necessarily untrue if read figuratively. When
Chamcha asks the manticore how "they" manage to turn
the immigrants into such weird creatures, he promptly replies,
"They have the power of description, and we succumb to the
pictures they construct" (168). But the novelist, Rushdie
goes on to imply, has the superior power of description, which
should enable him to overpower the descriptive discourse of the
racist immigration authorities. Like the novelist, these authorities
make the "story" they concoct about how Chamcha came
to be unconscious (mainly due to the beating they gave him) "more
convincing" by incorporating into their fiction the fact
that he was at any rate genuinely sick beforehand (169). Rushdie
parodies their method of telling a story by starting off as they
do with a fiction, such as the manticore, and then offering -
not facts, but a figurative explanation for the seemingly unreal
shapes they assume.
Interspersed
with the "realist" chapters are chapters in which Gibreel
is visited by unwanted dreams or nightmares. Paradoxically, within
his surreal world of dreams Gibreel becomes the spectator or participant
in a series of historically authenticated occurrences (suggesting
that history itself is a collective dreaming about the past).
His dream of Mahound (the Christian crusaders' demonic term of
abuse for Muhammad) incorporates numerous incidents from accounts
of the life of Muhammad. Similarly the story of Ayesha makes free
use of a widely reported episode that happened in Karachi in 1983
when Naseem Fatima led thirty eight Shi'a followers into the sea
which they expected to part for them. Another narrative strand
in Gibreel's dream chapters - the account of the Imam's return
from exile - resembles the Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran
on the downfall of the Shah in 1979.
Gibreel
is torn between a "real" world where the miraculous
happens and a world of dreams where the miraculous is restored
to an imagined but largely verifiable historical past. As Gibreel
gradually drifts into a state of schizophrenia Rushdie further
complicates the already confused distinction between material
and imaginative reality by showing the barrier between waking
and dreaming worlds slowly crumbling. Neither Gibreel nor the
reader can be sure of where one world ends and the other begins.
The resulting confusion can be either liberating or destructive.
"The imagination," Rushdie admits, "can falsify,
demean, ridicule, caricature and wound as effectively as it can
clarify, intensify and unveil" (Imaginary Homelands 143).
On the other hand he reveals his own prejudice when he inconsistently
insists that "the opposition of imagination to reality...reminds
us that we are not helpless; that to dream is to have power."
Here again we glimpse the will to power underlying fiction's will
to (imaginative) truth. Rushdie continues: "Unreality is
the only weapon with which reality can be smashed, so that it
may subsequently be reconstituted" (Imaginary Homelands 122).
But what does he mean by "reality"? Apparently "our
conventional, habit-dulled certainties about what the world is
and has to be," a world "in which things inevitably
get worse" (122). The dream worlds of the artist have "the
power . . . to oppose this dark reality" (122). Their (postmodern)
plurality, Rushdie asserts, brings the light of truth to a world
benighted by the unitary truths of politics and religion. But
the discourse of fiction is seen here to be as incapable as is
all true discourse, according to Foucault, "of recognizing
the will to truth which pervades it" (Archaeology/Discourse
219). It is as blind to its determination to establish its superior
status as are the discursive formations of nationalism and Islam
that it subordinates to its purposes. Discourse, like knowledge,
is necessarily contaminated by its desire to dominate.
How does fictional discourse exercise its power of constraint
on those totalizing discourses it opposes? Primarily by appropriation.
It incorporates them into its own discourse, one which ostensibly
throws all proclaimed truths into question. Whereas Muslims believe
that the archangel Gabriel dictated God's verses to Muhammad,
Mahound, in Rushdie's subversive version of the origins of the
Qu'ran, exercises a form of telepathy by means of which he mesmerizes
Gibreel into dictating what he (Mahound) needs from him. In other
words Rushdie replaces the unauthored word of God by the psychologized
interaction between the needful Prophet and his supposedly angelic
mouthpiece--an internal projection. Since Gibreel is responsible
for uttering under Mahound's spell both the Satanic verses and
their angelic rebuttal, the fictional discourse places him in
a position to throw doubt on Mahound's claim that the first set
of verses came from Satan:
Being
God's postman is no fun, yar.
Butbutbut: God isn't in this picture.
God knows whose postman I've been. (112)
Cast
in fictional discursive form and undermined by Rushdie's use of
a playful, punning tone, the absolutes of Islamic faith become
humanized and relativized. The mere substitution of "postman"
for " Messenger" reduces the sublime to the mundane.
Rushdie repeatedly exploits the polysemantic nature of language
to make us conscious of the possibility of alternative readings
that were present at the moment that the discourse of Islam privileged
one of them for its own use. For instance, Bostan, one of the
two gardens of paradise, is also the name of the plane which is
blown up by Sikh terrorists in the opening chapter of the book.
Paradise, then, within a framework of fictional discourse, offers
no haven from the uncertainties of this world. The sight of perfection
that Allie Cone glimpsed on Mount Everest is seen by this representative
figure of the postmodern world to be unattainable in the here
and now. Perfection entails absolute silence, according to Allie:
"why speak if you can't manage perfect thoughts, perfect
sentences" (296)? Entry into the world of language, as the
writer of fiction knows, entails the compromises and ambiguities
that accompany imperfection, a fact that the believers in scripture
deny. Within Rushdie's fictional universe most certainties (especially
those consolatory absolutes held by religion) crumble. Uncertainty
is the only unchanging certainty that Rushdie perversely posits
in the novel.
Within
his own discourse Rushdie performs what Foucault terms a genealogical
analysis on the discourse of Islam. Such an analysis involves
investigating how that discourse was formed, what were its norms,
and what were the conditions for its appearance, growth and variation
(Arcaeology/Discourse 231-2). Indeed it is precisely this interest
in what Foucault terms genealogy that predominates in this novel:
How
does newness come into the world? How is it born?
Of what fusions, translations, conjoinings is it made? (8)
Mahound's
discourse is founded on the insistence that there is only one
God. He imposes this monotheistic idea on the people of Jahilia
(meaning the period of ignorance prior to the advent of Islam),
themselves polytheists who have constructed their city out of
the shifting sands of the desert. Mahound's insistence on repetitive
ritual washing is itself a threat to the survival of their multifold
structures built of dry sand, as well as offering a paradigm of
the difference in their ideological positions. The Jahilian polytheists
(like contemporary postmodernists) can accept a greater degree
of linguistic discontinuity in their belief in gods with overlapping
powers and domains than can Mahound who belongs to what Foucault
terms the "'critical' group" which imposes "forms
of exclusion, limitation, and appropriation" on the threatening
linguistic universe (Knowledge/Discourse 231). Mahound's triumph
represents the imposition of a unitary belief system on a society
that resembled India where "the human population outnumbers
the divine by less than three to one" (16). Here Rushdie
combines a postcolonial admiration for Indian diversity with a
Western postmodern endorsement of the polysemantic nature of language.
But he seems to forget that diversity can be (and was in the case
of the British Empire) used to divide and rule.
What
also emerges from Rushdie's fictional historicization of the origins
of Islam is that Mahound began life as a successful businessman
(as Muhammad did) and subsequently used the new religion to consolidate
in business-like fashion his secular hold on power. Mahound moves
from the will to power to the will to truth which soon enough
reveals the underlying will to power that resurfaces as the religious
metamorphosizes into the political. Mahound is also likened to
Ibrahim (Abraham), who at God's command abandoned his wife in
the desert. The narrator comments, "From the beginning men
used God to justify the unjustifiable" (95). Such an aside
implicitly opposes a different discourse (humanism? feminism?)
to that of religion. But simultaneously it gives narratorial approval
to the opposing discourse, which defeats the ostensible postmodern
stance of universal doubt. The context suggests that the primary
discourse invoked is that of feminism. Much is made of Mahound's
imposition of a maximum of four wives on his followers while permitting
himself twelve. In a section of the novel that particularly inflamed
Muslims Rushdie parodies Mahound's household by inventing the
brothel in which Baal the poet (representative of the discourse
of literature) parallels Mahound and the twelve prostitutes he
marries take on the names of the Prophet's twelve wives. Sacred
(that is, divinely condoned) and secular sexuality, like sacred
and secular verbal creativity, are made to appear virtually identical
in a fictional context. The distinctions that define Islamic discourse
(Foucault's external rules of exclusion) are subtly elided until
that discourse merges into the discourse of fiction where it becomes
just another imaginative textual construct. In this instance Rushdie
is more successful in undermining a unitary discourse by placing
it in a discursive context that deliberately equates sacred and
secular through the use of literary parallelism.
Rushdie
has a more difficult task attempting a genealogical analysis of
the discourse of nationalism, if only because the formation of
nations predates recorded history. In the case of Britain he chooses
instead to invoke the Norman conquest of 1066 (an event used by
English historians to mark the beginning of the Middle Ages) by
having Gibreel and Chamcha fall to earth at Hastings, the sight
of the battle in which William the Conqueror defeated Harold and
replaced Anglo-Saxon civilization with a new regime. Just as William
swallowed a mouthful of sand on landing at Hastings, Gibreel swallows
a mouthful of snow, while Chamcha had already been forced to swallow
a kipper, bones and all, "the first step in his conquest
of England" (44). The narrative reminds us from the start
that Britain is the product of countless invasions each of which
has put new blood into its system. Gibreel invokes another royal
foreigner, William of Orange, whose bloodless revolution in 1688
brought with it an influx of new ideas from the Continent. Gibreel
reflects, "Not all migrants are powerless...They impose their
needs on their new earth, bringing their own coherence to the
new-found land, imagining it afresh" (458). The newest conquerors
are immigrants from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent.
Conquest, however, is not without its dangers. Both Williams died
of unnatural causes - Rushdie refers in the novel to the later
William's death from falling off his horse onto the hard earth
he'd civilized. Similarly one of the two migrant protagonists
and other immigrant characters in the novel meet unnatural deaths,
some at the hands of the xenophobic British authorities who remain
blind to their own mixed racial origins.
Margaret
Thatcher, who had been in power for over nine years by the time
the novel was published, comes in for harsher treatment than does
Mahound, being referred to as "Torture. Maggie the Bitch"
(269). Rushdie had been particularly enraged by a speech she had
made after Britain's victory against Argentina in the Falkland
Islands (Las Malvinas) in which she "most plainly nailed
her colours to the old colonial mast, claiming that the success
in the South Atlantic proved that the British were still the people
'who had ruled a quarter of the world'" (Imaginary Homelands
92). Unconsciously she was betraying the fact that she did not
consider immigrants like Rushdie who had come from the ruled quarter
to be a true part of the national identity. Rushdie goes further,
arguing that "the British authorities, no longer capable
of exporting governments, have chosen instead to import a new
Empire, a new community of subject peoples" (Imaginary Homelands
130). It is this attempt to reverse the course of history that
enables Rushdie to establish a link between Mrs. Thatcher and
the Imam, the contemporary representative of Islamic fundamentalism.
When Mrs. Thatcher called for a return to Victorian values, Rushdie
wrote, "she had embarked on a heroic battle against the linear
passage of Time" (Imaginary Homelands 92). In the novel Valance
makes the same point more colorfully to a disconcerted Chamcha.
The connection to the Imam becomes clear when the Imam tells an
equally disconcerted Gibreel that he will smash all the clocks
when he comes to power in the name of God's "boundless time,
that encompasses past, present and future; the timeless time,
that has no need to move." "I am eternity," he
asserts (214). Whereas Jean-François Lyotard and Fredric
Jameson both claim in their way that the postmodern entails a
denial of the forces of history, Rushdie's satire at the expense
of these two modern leaders who have set out to reverse the chronological
progression of time emanates more from his postcolonial belief
in the need to acknowledge the historical effects of imperialism
if these are to be overturned and left behind by the newly liberated
peoples of the old empires. The truly postmodern response to Mrs.
Thatcher's and the Imam's reversal of historical time would be
to allow temporal and atemporal forces equal play.
Instead
Rushdie attempts to subvert the uncreated word of God by rehistoricizing
the origins of Islam (just as he undermines the Thatcher regime's
desire to return to the Victorian days of Empire by staging a
race riot that is representative of contemporary immigrants' militant
rejection of the ideology of imperialism). He does this by turning
to a distinctive characteristic of literary discourse - literary
form - in order to subvert the claims to truth of Islamic discourse.
He employs a form that begins by attempting to distinguish through
alternating chapters between the waking present-day "reality"
of London (and Bombay) and Gibreel's dreams of his participation
in phantasmagoric historical events, and that deliberately engineers
the collapse of that distinction as the fictionality of the controlling
literary discourse asserts itself. In framing history within a
fictional context this novel is not behaving like a typical postmodern
work of art in which, as Fredric Jameson puts it, "the past
as 'referent' finds itself gradually bracketed, and then effaced
altogether" (18). Rather, the mythologized past of the origins
of Islam is given a sense of lived historical actuality by being
dramatized within the novel; in the process it is demystified
and returned to the fallible world of human need and error. Simultaneously
the fictionalized episodes involving Gibreel's and Chamcha's escapades
in Ellowen Deeowen (itself a product of fiction, a child's nursery
rhyme name for London) incorporate recognizable elements from
contemporary history: references to Enoch Powell's famous prediction
in a speech to the House of Commons in 1969 that rivers of blood
would flow if immigration to Britain were not severely restricted;
recognition that Mrs. Thatcher was attempting "literally
to invent a whole goddam new middle class in this country"
(270); the easily identifiable London ghetto of Brickhall where
the harassment of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent by police
and white youths boils over into a full scale race riot. In these
and other similar sections of the book contemporary reality constantly
erupts into and disrupts the impression that we are occupying
a world of pure imagination. This bricolage of historical and
fictional components is not available to the discourse of religion
for which a condition of the discourse is that the truth be accepted
as of divine origin. Whereas religion asserts the truth of its
discourse (itself a will to power), postmodern fiction ostensibly
questions all forms of truth--those of both historical fact and
fictional invention.
Or
does it? Behind the postmodern pastiche artist can't one discern
the traditional writer as seer? However, instead of finding truth
in long established shared verities, Rushdie privileges a non-totalized,
pluralistic, open ended form of discourse that coincides with
postmodern writing practices. Truth-value in his view is multiple
and conflicting; it comes closer in definition to the satisfactoriness
of belief favored by pragmatic philosophers. But the will to truth
persists. A radical postmodern stance, on the other hand, would
proclaim the inaccessibility of truth and confine itself to undermining
all claims to absolute truth by and in discourse. Rushdie's position
entails an assumption of superiority over those claiming to represent
the truth by demonstrating the impossibility of doing so. In contrast
Rushdie implicitly elevates the multiple and conflictual nature
of fictional discourse to a position of higher "truth."
The very fact that it can incorporate the truth of religion into
its manifold discourse--and The Satanic Verses certainly accomplishes
this--is intended to show the superiority of plural fictional
discourse to the unitary discourse of Islam. But, as Sara Suleri
has acutely pointed out, "the desacrilizing of religion"
in The Satanic Verses "can simultaneously constitute a resacrilizing
of history" (190). Even history, however, is subordinated
in the novel to the playful and irresistible powers of the artistic
imagination. And, despite Rushdie's assertions to the contrary,
the imagination goes well beyond the raising of questions in Rushdie's
fiction. He tends to say one thing while accomplishing another.
"Answers are cheap. Questions are hard to find," he
asserted on the occasion of his emergence from hiding in September
1995 to talk about his latest novel, The Moor's Last Sigh (Montalbano
E7). Yet the new novel shows him once again implicitly going beyond
mere questions when deploring "the tragedy of multiplicity
destroyed by singularity, the defeat of Many by One" (Wood
3). Why the insistence on binary polarity? What is wrong, for
instance, with the One and the Many? Is this not the more genuine
postmodern alternative to the exclusivity of the One?
Another
characteristic of fictional discourse which Rushdie uses to subvert
the truth claims of other unitary discourses is its ability to
exploit a disparity between tone and substance. Having already
written one comic epic (Midnight's Children ), Rushdie considered
The Satanic Verses the most comic of his first four novels (Jain
99). By "comedy" he understands "black comedy"
"that doesn't always make you laugh" (Haffenden 240).
Black comedy, which applies a comic tone to serious, even tragic
subject matter, is a mode that in its written form is largely
appropriated by literature. It is much used by postmodern writers
confronted with a world on the brink of self annihilation. Rushdie
makes skillful use of this mode to undercut the serious tone which
religious and political discourse employs most of the time. As
the narrator says at one point, all he can offer in place of tragedy
is the echo of it, a "burlesque for our degraded, imitative
times, in which clowns re-enact what was first done by heroes
and kings" (424). So heroes of the past (like Muhammad) are
transformed into burlesque images (like Mahound) of their heroic
models in this contemporary retelling of their stories.
Rushdie's
use of black comedy is particularly evident in the passages concerning
politics, capitalist greed and racism, all of which tend to mutually
support one another's rhetoric. The epitome of this ethos is a
minor character in the book, Hal Valance, an advertising executive
who used to employ Chamcha for the voice-overs in his commercials.
His hero is Deep Throat who advised Bob Woodward: Follow the money.
Hal takes this advice to heart. Over lunch he confides to Chamcha:
"I...love
this fucking country. That's why I'm going to sell it to the whole
goddamn world, Japan, America, fucking Argentina. I'm going to
sell the arse off it. That's what I've been selling all my fucking
life: the fucking nation. The flag." (268)
Hal
uses market research to justify removing all signs of black immigrants
from his commercials, ending up by sacking Chamcha for being "a
person of the tinted persuasion" (267). His justification:
"ethnics don't watch ethnic shows" (265). Chamcha's
media image is "just too damn racial" (265). (It is
interesting that most of Hal's racial prejudices echo actual instances
of racism that Rushdie records encountering while working for
the advertising industry - see Imaginary Homelands 136-7.) Hal
has no compunction about projecting his racism onto the immigrant
community by accusing Chamcha of being too alien even for his
fellow immigrants (for the "ethnic universe" as Hal
puts it in his execrable commercialized jargon).
Political opposition to Hal's television show in which Chamcha
starred comes from a black activist, Dr. Uhuru Simba. The police
claim that, while under arrest, he fell off the lower of two bunks
in his cell on waking up from a nightmare and broke his neck falling
to the floor. The absurd improbability of this explanation is
typical of the way Rushdie employs black humor to expose the repeated
instances of racial bias offered during the eighties by the British
police, who habitually employed a quasi-legal terminology (such
as is used by the Community Relations Officer in the book) to
lie their way out of their illegal actions. It is interesting
to reflect that the reality of the lies told in court by the police
during the prosecution of the Birmingham Five (or by Mark Fuhrman
during the O.J. Simpson trial) was actually more subversive of
social justice than the hilarious and absurd explanations offered
in Rushdie's novel for the death in jail of Dr. Simba. The exposure
effected by the supposedly superior discourse of fiction is less
credible, if more enjoyable, than the simultaneous press exposure
of police perjury by the supposedly inferior discourse of the
media. Comedy, in this case black comedy, may expose the hypocrisies
of those in authority, but cannot and does not attempt to affect
the course of social history in the way that more utilitarian
discourses can and do. In his role as a postmodern writer, Rushdie,
in "bracketing off the real social world," (as Terry
Eagleton writes of all postmodernists) "must simultaneously
bracket off the political forces which seek to transform that
order" (?).
The
feature of fictional discourse that, it is claimed, distinguishes
it from all other discourses is its unique and special use of
language. Ever since the Russian Formalists argued that literary
language defamiliarizes "everyday" language (but which?
and whose?), there seems to have been general agreement that the
discourse of fiction has at its disposal uses of language that
other discourses may borrow but do not deploy systematically.
If one accepts Foucault's assertion that discursive formations
are governed by internal and external thresholds and limits "to
master and control the great proliferation of discourse, in such
a way as to relieve its richness of its most dangerous elements"
and "to organize its disorder so as to skate round its most
uncontrollable aspects" (Archaeology/Discourse 228), then
the question arises whether literature is privileged above other
forms of discourse because it allows within its borders more of
the dangers and disorder of uncontrolled discourse, ostensible
chains of signifiers refusing all semblance of closure. Foucault
at times suggests as much, as when he writes, for instance, that
"literature's task is to say the most unsayable-the worst,
the most secret, the most intolerable, the shameless" (Power,
Truth, Strategy 91). Surely this is just what The Satanic Verses
is doing? In a key essay, "Is Nothing Sacred?" Rushdie
claims that one way in which his use of literary language acts
in just this fashion is by undermining the monologic discourse
of religion: "whereas religion seeks to privilege one language
above all others, one text above all others, one set of values
above all others, the novel has always been about the way in which
different languages, values and narratives quarrel, and about
the shifting relations between them, which are relations of power"
(Imaginary Homelands 420). If Rushdie begins to sound like Foucault
here this may be because he has read him and goes on in the essay
to quote extensively from his "What is an Author?".
It is significant, however, that neither Foucault nor Rushdie
are entirely consistent in their claim to see in literary discourse
a (negative) superiority over rival discursive formations.
By
placing the monologic discourses of Islam and of nationalism within
the polyglossic and heteroglossic discourse of fiction, Rushdie
is able to decenter them and reveal the self interest that lies
behind all special uses of language--except that of fiction to
which he remains largely blind. Rushdie is extremely adept at
using literary language to expose the polysemantic nature of terminology
given a unitary (or, as Bakhtin would say, a centripetal) interpretation
by the forces of authority. His sheer linguistic inventiveness
produces neologisms whose uncomfortable conjunctions expose the
contradictions inherent in the original word-"Bungledish"
and "BabyLondon" come to mind. With one inventive word
combination, London, the imperial center, the epitome of wealth
and power, that held its colonial peoples in captivity as Nebuchadnezzar
did the Jews, is by verbal association made to share the downfall
of Babylon and become "the habitation of devils" (Rev.
18.2). Similarly he strings words together the effect of which
is to undermine the conventional distinction between them: "angelicdevilish,"
or "information/inspiration." Another linguistic feature
that enables Rushdie to make seemingly impossible connections
in this particular novel is his multiple use of the same proper
names. He takes from Islamic history Ayesha, the name of the Prophet's
favorite wife, and uses the same name for the most popular of
the prostitutes in the Jahilia brothel, for the Muslim visionary
who led her fellow villagers to drown in the sea, and for one
of the girl prostitutes in London. Sacred and profane versions
of womanhood become fused and indistinguishable by this linguistic
sleight of hand. Whereas all the Ayeshas exist in Gibreel's dreams,
the name of Gibreel's lover, Alleluia Cone, who belongs to the
waking world, becomes metamorphosed via her nickname, Allie, to
Al-Lat, the goddess denounced by Mahound, and to Mount Cone (the
equivalent to Mount Hira in Islamic tradition) which Mahound ascends
to receive the words of Allah, both of which feature in Gibreel's
dream world. In this instance Rushdie is using language to reinforce
the lack of distinction between material and imaginative worlds.
Many other characters share their name with characters who belong
to a different narrative sequence, such as Mishal, Hind, and Salman,
Mahound's scribe, who bears the same name as the author. Salman,
when he starts deliberately mistranscribing Mahound's dictation,
discovers that his "poor words could not be distinguished
from the Revelation by God's own Messenger" (367). Rushdie's
mischievous use of his own name for this character cannot help
privileging Salman's subversive discourse in which the natural
slippage of language undermines the divine status of the Q'uran.
Is this deliberate on Rushdie's part? - an attempt to escape from
his own logocentrism by acknowledging it? Or is he once again
giving narrative sanction to the superior status of literary discourse?
Rushdie
repeatedly dramatizes the heteroglossic quarrel between languages
that he, like Bakhtin, considers the special province of fictional
discourse. Heteroglossia, according to Bakhtin, is "another's
speech in another's language . . . a special type of double-voiced
discourse" (324). On two occasions Rushdie pits a poet's
linguistic dexterity against the thunderings of, respectively,
a politician and a prophet. Enoch Powell's racist speech threatening
rivers of blood is appropriated by the immigrant Jumpy Joshi as
the title and subject for a poem in which the river of blood of
the slain is transformed into the river of blood of humanity in
all its variety: "Reclaim the metaphor, Jumpy Joshi had told
himself. Turn it; make it a thing we can use" (186). The
second instance involves the linguistic battle between Baal, the
satirical poet, and Mahound who stands opposed to all poets and
poetry. Baal pits his poetic satires against Mahound's Recitation.
The role of the poet, Baal declares, echoing Foucault, is to "name
the unnamable, to point at frauds, to take sides, start arguments,
shape the world and stop it going to sleep" (97). Words,
it turns out, can be mortal (as Rushdie knows to his cost). When
Mahound finally has Baal in his power he orders him and the twelve
prostitutes he married to be executed. "Whores and writers,
Mahound," Baal shouts as he is dragged away. "We are
the people you can't forgive." To which Mahound replies,
"Writers and whores. I see no difference" (392). The
grand narrative of religion can only see the plural and contradictory
discourse of literature, what Rushdie has called "the schismatic
Other of the sacred (and authorless) text," as a prostitution
of the one truth (Imaginary Homelands 424). But doesn't the decentered
discourse of postmodern literature equally see the grand narrative
of religion as a prostitution of the truth? Why does its plurality
and fragmentation make it preferable to a unitary master narrative?
Different, yes. More comprehensive, because less insistent on
the unitary nature of truth, maybe. But superior? It still betrays
the same will to power as those grand narratives that it despises.
Although
Foucault at times appears to suggest that fictional discourse
enjoys some exemption from the limitations governing other discursive
formations, in "The Discourse of Language" he treats
literary discourse as an exemplary case when outlining the program
for a critical (as opposed to a genealogical) analysis of discourse.
Critical analysis involves identifying the forms of exclusion,
limitation and appropriation that enable us "to conceive
discourse as a violence that we do things, or, at all events,
as a practice we impose upon them" (Archaeology/Discourse
229). Rushdie sees fictional discourse as an opportunity to counter
"false" narratives, such as that of national politics,
with the supposedly superior truth-value of imaginative literature.
"I think it is a curious phenomenon of the twentieth century,"
Rushdie has said, "that politicians have got very good at
inventing fictions which they tell us as the truth. It then becomes
the job of the makers of fiction to start telling the (real) truth"
(Interview, BBC). Whether the "(real)" is Rushdie's
or Malice Ruthven's explanatory addition when she transcribed
this excerpt, the claim to have access to the truth (and what
is an unreal truth?) reveals the contradiction that lies at the
heart of Rushdie's fictional polemic. The "real truth"
is exactly what every discourse aspires to embody, according to
Foucault. In Foucaultian terms The Satanic Verses has the same
truth-value as those discourses it sets out to undermine. Its
author unabashedly asserts that its own set of truths consist
of "hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation
that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings,
cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs" (Imaginary Homelands
394). Rushdie additionally claims that his use of non-naturalistic
material in his books constitutes "a method of producing
intensified images of reality" (Haffenden 246). In privileging
the non-naturalistic, is not Rushdie displaying his own discursive
rules of exclusion, limitation and appropriation that do as much
violence to things as do discourses privileging the naturalistic?
Certainly others have interpreted his use of magic realism in
less positive ways. Sara Suleri, for instance, felt that in Shsme
it represented a "startlingly conservative need to take refuge
in formalism" (175). What appears to be a form of freedom
in one discourse, that of literature, appears to be a sterile
retreat within the context of another, that of liberal politics.
Rushdie's
stream of comments about the nature of his work falls under one
of Foucault's internal, as opposed to external, set of rules whereby
"discourse exercises its own control" (Archaeology/Discourse
220). Foucault's diagnosis of the function of commentary is amusing,
paradoxical and disturbing (for those of us engaged in the act
of commentary). "Commentary," he writes, "averts
the chance element of discourse by giving it its due: it gives
us the opportunity to say something other than the text itself,
but on condition that it is the text itself which is uttered and,
in some ways, finalized" (221). Commentary, in other words,
is charged with restricting the potentiality of discourse to proliferate
uncontrollably by the use of repetition. Very few other novels
have generated the volume of commentary that The Satanic Verses
has in the short period since it was published. Most of these
commentaries have attempted to appropriate the book to a particular
ideology - anti Islamic, pro-Islamic, secular, postcolonial, postmodern,
etcetera. By ignoring the totality of voices and discourses within
the novel, they seek to fix its meaning within their particular
discursive field. Rushdie's own voluminous commentary focuses
on the plurality of meanings that postmodern fiction nurtures
and exploits. But he remains blind to the fact that the indeterminacy
and universal doubt which his commentary champions is frequently
abandoned in the novel, not just when he assumes his post-colonial
mantle, but also when satirizing the abuses of Islamic religion.
Incidents such as the burning of the wax effigy of Mrs. Thatcher
and the Imam's swallowing whole the armies of his supporters demonize
the two leaders of racist nationalism and militant Islamic militancy
respectively in such a way as to leave little or no room for alternative
readings. Rushdie might argue in his defence that he has also
demonized his narrator, although his treatment of him is more
ambivalent - and therefore truer to the spirit of the postmodern
- than is his representation of the two leaders. Often posing
as the Devil, the narrator is careful to leave open the possibility
that he may as readily represent "Ooparvala." "The
Fellow Upstairs," as "Neechayvala," "the Guy
from Underneath" (318). Under cover of this ambivalence the
narrator in his own commentary on the action betrays a fundamental
vacillation between a postmodern open-endedeness and an older
humanist defense of liberal values.
But
what of my own and similar instances of literary commentary that
focus on (and thereby implicitly endorse) the novel's plurality
of discourses, its multiplicity of voices, its postmodern resistance
to totalizing explanations, positivist ideologies and narrative
closure? Don't I have Rushdie's own commentaries as a guarantee
of authenticity? Couldn't I argue that Rushdie and I in our commentaries
are both opening up his fictional discourse, rather than circumscribing
its fortuitousness, its propensity to semantically proliferate?
After all the novel undermines not just Islamic fundamentalism
but Christian fundamentalism (Eugene Dumsday, the American evangelist),
not just British racism, but Indian racism (Hindu nationalism).
It even makes fun of Baal, the representative of literary discourse
within this literary discourse, Baal whose poems as he grows old
degenerate into celebrations of loss. And yet does it really put
down Baal's poetry? What form does his loss take? "It led
him to create chimeras of form, lionheaded goatbodied serpenttailed
impossibilities whose shapes felt obliged to change the moment
they were set, so that the demotic forced its way into lines of
classical purity and images of love were constantly degraded by
the intrusion of elements of farce" (370). Isn't this a description
of Rushdie's own style of writing? Isn't one of the features of
postmodernism its conjunction of the demotic with the classical
- what Fredric Jameson terms "aesthetic populism" (2)?
Compared to the (modernist) clarity and finished quality of Mahound's
verses, are not Baal's an anachronistic anticipation of postmodern
literature? Doesn't Baal conveniently conform to Rushdie's definition
of his own position within the contemporary literary universe?
And do not Baal and Rushdie claim a privileged status for that
position? And by writing this commentary am I not employing what
Foucault calls "the infinite rippling of commentary"
in order "to say finally, what has silently been articulated
deep down" (Archaeology/Discourse 221)? Am I not privileging
those qualities of semantic plurality and endless signification
that characterize his and other postmodern literary discourses
at the expense of the monologic utterances of religious, political
and other authorities? Bakhtin, on the other hand, insists that
"[l]anguage . . . is never unitary" (288). He claims
that "[e]very concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves
as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are
brought to bear" (272). If The Satanic Verses is intent on
exposing the centrifugal forces concealed within the discourses
of politics and religion, then it would be appropriate for a commentator
on the novel to concentrate on centripetal forces lurking behind
its postmodern carnivalesque facade.
Instead,
even the best commentators attempt to impose their own circumscription
on the novel's tendency to semantically proliferate. Consider
the commentary of Homi Bhabha. In his view it is Rushdie's contextualization
of the Qu'ran within the discourse of postmodern fiction that
has brought on the charge of blasphemy:
It
is not that the "content" of the Koran is directly disputed;
rather, by revealing other enunciatory positions and possibilities
within the framework of Koranic reading, Rushdie performs the
subversion of its authenticity by the act of cultural translation
- he relocates the Koran's "intentionality" by repeating
and reinscribing it in the locale of the novel of postwar cultural
migrations and diasporas. (226)
In
his commentary Homi Bhabha is intent on revealing the impersonal
operations of cultural translation. Blasphemy, he contends, constitutes
"a moment when the subject-matter or the content of a cultural
tradition is being overwhelmed or alienated, in the act of translation"
(225). Rushdie's secular translation of the origins of Islam is
itself the product of "the disjunctive rewriting of the transcultural,
migrant experience" (226). Homi Bhabha is clearly employing
a postcolonial critical perspective. So he is endorsing, by reinterpreting,
Rushdie's implicit ideological stance, on the grounds that it
is representative of the way postcolonial newness makes its contribution
to the postmodern world. As Foucault ironically observes, "the
novelty lies no longer in what is said, but in its reappearance"
(221). The apparent openness of postmodernism to both or all sides
of an argument seems calculated to invite readers and commentators
(even Rushdie) alike to try to tie down and circumscribe the plurality
of meanings playfully offered by the text.
Foucault
has not finished with me/us yet. Literary discourse, he argues,
is also a prime example of a "fellowship of discourse"
whose function is "to preserve or reproduce discourse, but
in order that it should circulate within a closed community..."
(Archaeology/Knowledge 225). Ridiculous, the reader will say.
Anyone who wants to can read The Satanic Verses. But look at what
happens to those who attempt to read it outside the literary fellowship.
Enraged Muslims are reminded by those within the fellowship that
this is mere fiction. To read into a novel an act of blasphemy
is to misunderstand the nature of fictional discourse. As Billy
Batusta, the producer of a "theological" movie about
the life of Muhammad says in the novel, when asked if it would
not be seen as blasphemous, "Certainly not. Fiction is fiction;
facts are facts" (272). Rushdie has echoed this argument
privileging the literary reading over all others in his many commentaries
defending the novel. So have most of the book's commentators.
When Margaret Thatcher and her foreign secretary dared to apologize
on behalf of the British nation for any offense the book might
have caused and expressed a dislike of its contents, the Financial
Times published a rebuke from within the literary community proclaiming
that "they are wholly unqualified, in their capacity as elected
politicians, to have a useful opinion" on matters of literary
taste (Appignanesi 148) - a perfect instance of the operation
of a fellowship of discourse claiming exclusive right to comment
on one of its own productions.
So
where do I stand as a critic of this novel within the fellowship
of discourse? Should I, in typical poststructuralist fashion,
explore the semantic multiplicity of this text, its inclusion
of competing discursive formations, its self-conscious deconstruction
of its apparent thematic position(s)? Yet isn't there something
hypocritical about this impersonal stance? Like Rushdie, I lost
my religious faith long ago, and share with him his dislike of
religious dogmatism as well as his admiration for the state of
transcendence that religion can produce. Like him I was politically
opposed to the Thatcher government's implicitly racist attitudes
while living in London during her period in office. I have no
patience with the concept of blasphemy (which incidentally illustrates
another of Foucault's rules determining conditions under which
discourse may be employed - ritual, which restricts who may even
talk about the discursive content). Am I to pretend that I have
no opinions of my own? Won't my readers and students simply lose
patience with my liberal refusal to take sides? The appeal to
plurality, with which much of the time I find myself in sympathy,
seems to me totally inappropriate when faced with the need to
take a unitary stand on subjects like the Thatcher government's
immigration policy.
Is
not, then, what is missing in Rushdie's fiction any critique of
the pluralist position he espouses in his fiction? In his commentaries
on the novel he is prepared to adopt, as we have seen, a unitary
(and superior) attitude to the dogma of Islamic fundamentalism
and Thatcherite racism. What is missing is any recognition on
his part of this contradiction between his defence of his unitary
stance as commentator of his own work and the creative plurality
lying at the center of his imaginative fiction. So there appears
to be no escape from the blindnesses and limitations of discursive
formations within which we operate. All I can do, and have done,
is to make explicit the limitations of the literary discourses
that on the one hand Rushdie and on the other hand I are working
within. They are not superior to others. I choose to read and
comment on fictional discourse finally because I personally feel
more comfortable within it, because I like to enter the world
of Wonderland where writers name the unnamable, where language
is a tool of power, where dreams hold their own with material
reality, and where, as Blake wrote (whom Rushdie quotes in the
novel), "a firm perswasion that a thing is so" will
"make it so" (338).
Works Cited
Ahmad, Aijaz. In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. London:
Verso, 1992.
Appignanesi, Lisa, and Sara Maitland, eds. The Rushdie File. London:
Fourth Estate, 1989.
Bakhtin, M. M. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Trans. Caryl
Emerson and Michael Holquist. Ed. Holquist. Austin: U of Texas
P, 1981.
Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge,
1994.
Eagleton, Terry. Against the Grain. London: Verso 1986.
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse
on Language. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon/Random,
1972.
---. Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy. Trans. Paul Foss
and Meagan Morris. Ed. Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton. Sydney:
Feral Publications, 1979.
Haffenden, John. Novelists in Interview. London: Methuen, 1985.
Jain, Madhu. Interview. India Today 15 Sept. 1988: 98-99.
Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism. Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
Montalbano, William D. "Salman Rushdie Moves Out From the
Shadows." Los Angeles Times 14 Sept. 1995: E1, 7.
Mufti, Aamir. "Reading the Rushdie Affair: An Essay on Islam
and Politics." Social Text 29 (1991): 95-116.
Rushdie, Salman. Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991.
New York: Granta Books in association with Viking Penguin, 1991.
---. Interview. Desert Island Discs. BBC Radio 4, London. 8 Sept.
1988.
---. The Satanic Verses. New York: Viking Penguin, 1989.
Ruthven, Malise. A Satanic Affair: Salman Rushdie and the Rage
of Islam. London: Chatto & Windus, 1990.
Suleri, Sara. The Rhetoric of English India. Chicago: U of Chicago
P, 1992.
Wood, Michael. "Shenanigans." London Review of Books
7 Sept. 1995: 3, 5.
[ Credit: Copyright 1998 Brian Finney]
What
About Rushdie?
By Paul Theroux
HONOLULU -- When the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini first issued
his decree against Salman Rushdie three years ago tomorrow, I
swear I thought it was a joke -- a very bad joke, a bit like "Papa
Doc" Duvalier putting a voodoo curse on Graham Greene for
writing "The Comedians," but a joke nevertheless, in
the sense of being an example of furious but harmless flatulence
-- just wind.
I
thought the death sentence would be laughed off -- condemned as
despicable, and then mocked. Of course, I did not foresee much
merriment about "The Satanic Verses" in any Islamic
state, where building blueprints have to be submitted to a board
of Islamic scholars, the ulema, so that the authorities can make
sure that no toilet faces Mecca.
Where
toys and calendars and mugs based on the Muppet figure of "Miss
Piggy" are dragged from shops by the religious police and
ritually destroyed. Where there are equally batty and murderous-sounding
fatwas, such as the recent one delivered by a Saudi Arabian official
cleric that declared that as all Shiite Muslims are heretics they
should all be killed.
You
know you have traveled through the looking glass when you are
in a land where Miss Piggy is seen as the very embodiment of evil.
How
disgusting to see that so far the intimidation of fanatics has
worked. Mr. Rushdie is in hiding, his book is still vilified,
his life is still threatened. Most countries, including his own,
Britain, are doing business with Iran, buying its oil and cashew
nuts, and selling the Iranians new cars and wristwatches, and
sending them paper and ink so they can print their fatuous laws.
Trading
partners in Europe and the U.S. are treating the Islamic Republic
of Iran as though it is a thoroughly rational place, when any
fool can see that the Ayatollah's fatwa is barbarous, as well
as, from the point of view of international law, an example of
criminal incitement.
In
Sydney, Australia, one of my taxi drivers was an economic refugee
from Pakistan, a man of 60, with a science degree from Karachi
University. We talked about the Koran for a while, and then I
asked him about the fatwa. His bony hands tightened on the steering
wheel: "Rushdie must die."
I
had a similar encounter in rural Fiji. Also with a credulous Muslim.
Naturally I set these people straight: I suggested to them that
these were ignorant sentiments. And I mentioned my experiences
to Mr. Rushdie's Australian publishers. These Australians, living
in a democratic country, with a tradition of rugged individualism
and a talent for being rude, said confidentially that they were
frightened. One said, "Some of us have families."
This
is all very discouraging. On a personal level people are muddled
or uninterested; on an official and governmental level, the response
has been weak and cowardly; on a religious level, the Muslims
have either been supine or vindictive.
There
is very little that Salman Rushdie can do himself. The task is
for the rest of us to resist the notion that beheadings and ritual
destruction of toys are rational and humane, and that a religious
leader in one country has the power to condemn a citizen of another
country to death for writing a book.
We
often find ourselves in odd postures in our dealings with the
Islamic world. It always strikes me as perverse when British and
U.S. academics willingly go to any number of countries and teach
in schools where women are segregated from men and the laws are
medieval. They do it for the money.
The
governments that have been timid in defending Mr. Rushdie's rights
have been influenced by money, too. They need to see him as he
is -- a hostage to much worse fanaticism than confined Terry Anderson
or John McCarthy. It is not just Hezbollah but the entire Muslim
world that has been urged to kill him.
The
first step is for governments and world leaders to speak out on
Salman Rushdie's behalf.
Then
it is our turn -- the readers and writers. It is obvious that
if any of us raises the fatwa in Iran or Saudi Arabia or Pakistan,
or like-minded countries, Mr. Rushdie will be vilified and we
will be hounded. But this ought not to be the case in the rest
of the world. Any non-Muslim country with the rule of law ought
to be a safe haven for Salman Rushdie, where he can walk the streets
and ride the buses and live without fear of being set upon.
It
is awkward to be talking about Muslims this way because Islam
is one of the world's great religions and many of its tenets are
humane. But Muslims who do not understand that we regard the fatwa
as an aberration must be singled out, because only they pose a
threat to Mr. Rushdie.
With
his confinement in mind, I have made a point of asking all the
Muslims I meet their views on Mr. Rushdie and his book. I have
had some crisp replies, but I still think my little practice is
salutary.
It
ought to happen everywhere: first the question -- What about Rushdie?
-- and if the answer is hostile, set them straight. This should
also happen on an official level, whenever a world leader communicates
with President Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran. What about Rushdie?
I have no doubt that eventually the message will get through,
and he will be free.
Paul
Theroux is author of the forthcoming travel book, "The Happy
Isles of Oceania
[Credit: New York Times, February 13, 1992.]